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INTRODUCTION
Roman Cavanaugh, Jr., an enrolled member of the Spirit Lake
Sioux Tribe, was driving one evening with his common-law wife
and their children.1 Both adults were intoxicated and began to
argue with each other.2 As the altercation escalated, Roman
grabbed his wife’s head, jerked it back and forth, and then
slammed it into the dashboard of the vehicle.3 After pulling the car
into a field, Roman’s wife jumped out of the vehicle and hid in
fear.4 Roman eventually drove away, with the children still in the
vehicle, and was later arrested and charged with domestic assault.5
Because Roman had previous convictions of domestic assault in
tribal court, after this incident, the U.S. federal government
charged him with “Domestic Assault by a Habitual Offender” (18
U.S.C. § 117).6
Roman Cavanaugh’s case was heard in an Eighth Circuit
district court that held that his previous tribal convictions could not
be used as the predicate offenses for charges under § 117. 7 The
court made ruled based on the fact that Cavanaugh’s three previous
tribal convictions were the result of proceedings that occurred
without legal representation.8 Subsequently, the appellate court
reversed the district court’s ruling, holding that because no actual
constitutional violation had occurred, use of the tribal convictions
was not precluded.9
Currently, a circuit split exists regarding whether tribal
convictions in which the defendant did not have counsel can be
used as the predicate offenses for charges brought under § 117.
This split was recently highlighted in United States v. Bryant,
where a Ninth Circuit appellate court denied the use of the
defendant’s prior tribal convictions to substantiate federal criminal

1

United States v. Cavanaugh, 643 F.3d 592, 594 (8th Cir. 2011).
Id.
3
Id.
4
Id.
5
Id.
6
Id.
7
Id. at 593.
8
Id. at 594.
9
Id. at 606.
2
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charges under § 117.10 Conversely, the Eighth and Tenth circuits
have held that tribal convictions can be used for charges under §
117.11
Domestic violence is an epidemic12 that warrants considerable
attention in the United States, regardless of racial classification.
Furthermore, Indians are significantly more likely to be physically
assaulted when compared to all other racial classifications.13
Holding Indian domestic abusers accountable cannot be done
singlehandedly by tribal courts nor by U.S. federal courts because
of the unique relationship between the two governing systems.
Prior to 2010, tribal courts were unable to impose sentences of
incarceration greater than one year.14 Additionally, tribal courts
have primary jurisdiction over their members for certain criminal
and civil actions.15 Contrary to its U.S. counterpart, if a tribal court
conviction imposes a sentence of one year or less, that tribal
proceeding does not warrant court-appointed counsel.16 As
previously mentioned, this situation has occurred in at least three
U.S. circuit courts, with different results.
This Article argues that the U.S. Supreme Court should uphold
the ability of federal courts to use tribal domestic assault
10

United States v. Bryant, 769 F.3d 671, 679 (9th Cir. 2014).
See Cavanaugh, 643 F.3d at 605; United States v. Shavanaux, 647 F.3d 993,
1000 (10th Cir. 2011).
12
Melissa Jeltsen, Joe Biden: Domestic Violence is a ‘Public Health Epidemic’,
HUFFINGTON POST (Mar. 20, 2015, 4:45 PM),
http://www.huffingtonpost.com/2015/03/20/biden-domestic-violenceepidemic_n_6911820.html.
13
Tribal Communities, U.S. DEP’T. OF JUSTICE - OFFICE ON VIOLENCE AGAINST
WOMEN, http://www.justice.gov/ovw/tribal-communities (last visited Dec. 5,
2014); see also PATRICIA TJADEN, NANCY THOENNES, U.S. DEP’T OF JUSTICE,
FULL REPORT OF THE PREVALENCE, INCIDENCE, AND CONSEQUENCES OF
VIOLENCE AGAINST WOMEN: RESEARCH REPORT – FINDINGS FROM THE
NATIONAL VIOLENCE AGAINST WOMEN SURVEY (2000), available at
https://www.ncjrs.gov/pdffiles1/nij/183781.pdf.
14
The Tribal Law and Order Act (TLOA) has increased the authority of tribal
courts to impose sentences of incarceration up to three years, however, not all
tribes have implemented TLOA. 25 U.S.C. § 1302(7)(B)–(C) (2012); NAT’L
CONG. OF AM. INDIANS, Tribes Exercising Enhanced Sentencing, TRIBAL LAW
& ORDER RES. CTR, http://tloa.ncai.org//tribesexercisingTLOA.cfm (last visited
Nov. 25, 2014).
15
25 U.S.C. §§ 1302, 1304(b) (2012).
16
25 U.S.C. § 1302(c) (2012).
11
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convictions in cases that are absent of other alleged improprieties,
to meet the elements of § 117. Recognition of tribal convictions
should be extended on principles of comity because: 1) tribal
sovereignty preceded the formation of the United States
Constitution, and as such, the Constitution does not govern tribes;
2) the Sixth Amendment does not apply to tribal proceedings so
convictions without defense counsel can never be Sixth
Amendment violations; and 3) although upholding the use of
uncounseled tribal convictions would result in unique
circumstances that are applicable only to Indians, precluding courts
from subsequently recognizing such convictions would also result
in circumstances applicable only to Indians; Indian domestic
assault victims would be left uniquely endangered and vulnerable.
Following this Introduction, Part I provides a brief history of
U.S. courts’ treatment of Indian tribes as both dependent wards of
the federal government and sovereign nations operating within the
U.S. system. Part II examines the avenues by which Indian tribal
sovereignty can be upheld in the U.S. federal system. Part III
discusses the unique relationship between federal and tribal courts
and the rights afforded within each venue. Part IV examines the
arguments that have been raised by Indian defendants, advocating
for preclusion of federal recognition of their tribal convictions.
Finally, this Article concludes by emphasizing the need and
importance for U.S. Supreme Court review on this issue.
I. BACKGROUND
To understand the complexity that underlies the relationship
between Indian tribal courts and U.S. federal courts, this Article
begins with a brief history of Indian tribal sovereignty. This
section examines the way U.S. federal courts have historically
treated tribal adjudicatory jurisdiction and provides the context for
analyzing the three cases that have led to the current circuit split.
A. History of United States Courts’ Treatment of Tribal
Sovereignty
Historically, tribal sovereignty has experienced intermittent
definitional changes dating back to the Marshall trilogy of cases
beginning in 1823. In Johnson v. M’Intosh, the Supreme Court
held that Indian rights to complete sovereignty “were necessarily
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diminished” upon the “discovery” of the North American land that
eventually became the United States (also referred to as the
“Discovery Doctrine”).17 Then, in Cherokee Nation v. Georgia, the
majority opinion conceded that Indian tribes held similar status to
that of states, but restricted that sovereignty by labeling tribes as
“domestic dependent nations.”18 Subsequently, the opinion in
Worcester v. Georgia stated that, “The Indian nations had always
been considered as distinct, independent, political communities,
retaining their original natural rights.”19 U.S. courts have continued
to struggle to find a balance between the tribal right to sovereignty
that preceded U.S. formation, and the need for the U.S.
government to have ultimate control over Indian lands and tribal
members.20
Indian tribes, at minimum, retain the sovereign powers that are
not limited by Congress.21 As such, Congress retains plenary
power to affirm, restrict, or eliminate Indian tribal power.22
Furthermore, Congress has affirmed the inherent tribal rights of
self-government over Indian criminal matters.23 However, tribal
authority to prosecute criminal matters is limited in the types of
crimes that may be prosecuted as well as the punishments that
tribes can impose.24 In instances of domestic violence, Congress
has explicitly afforded Indian tribes the ability to exercise “special
domestic violence jurisdiction” over tribal members and their
significant others.25 The deviation resulting in the current circuit
split results from tribal exercises of self-governance over domestic
assault offenders on tribal reservations.
17

Johnson v. M’Intosh, 21 U.S. 543, 574 (1823).
Cherokee Nation v. Georgia, 30 U.S. 1, 17 (1831) (emphasis added).
19
Worcester v. Georgia, 31 U.S. 515, 559 (1832).
20
See Philip J. Prygoski, From Marshall to Marshall: The Supreme Court’s
changing stance on tribal sovereignty,
www.americanbar.org/content/newsletter/publications/gp_solo_magazine_home
/gp_solo_magazine_index/marshall.html (last visited Dec. 15, 2015).
21
Id.
22
WILLIAM C. CANBY, JR., AMERICAN INDIAN LAW IN A NUTSHELL 79 (5th ed.
2009).
23
18 U.S.C. §§ 1152, 1153 (2012); CANBY, supra note 22, at 92.
24
CANBY, supra note 22, at 152.
25
25 U.S.C. § 1304(b) (2012). However, not all cases of domestic violence
involving tribal members will fall under tribal jurisdiction. § 1304(b)(4).
18
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The U.S. Constitution does not govern Indian tribes.26 This
difference in criminal procedure results in the two sovereign
systems overlapping each other, which requires some sort of
accord between the two systems. Limiting the ability of tribes to
adequately punish habitual domestic assault offenders, and
preventing federal courts from subsequently using tribal
convictions to punish habitual domestic assault offenders, would
leave Indian domestic assault victims in a uniquely dangerous and
vulnerable state.
B. The Cases Giving Rise to the Circuit Split
Tribal courts, at a minimum, have the ability to impose up to
one year of incarceration on uncounseled convictions as authorized
by the Indian Civil Rights Act (ICRA).27 Conversely, U.S. federal
and state courts cannot constitutionally impose any term of
incarceration unless a defendant has knowingly waived or received
the right to counsel, as mandated by the Federal Constitution.28
Under 18 U.S.C. § 117, “Any person who commits a domestic
assault within . . . Indian country and who has a final conviction on
at least [two] separate prior occasions in . . . Indian tribal court
proceeding” will be charged and could receive a prison sentence
for up to ten years.29 The act expressly encompasses Indian
country and its tribal court proceedings, however, Congress did not
expressly address whether such convictions may be used by federal
courts in cases where the tribal proceedings did not include
protections similar to those afforded by the U.S. Constitution.
1. United States v. Bryant
In a decision issued on September 30, 2014, the Ninth Circuit
U.S. Court of Appeals held that the federal charges brought under
§ 117, for domestic assault by a habitual offender, against Michael
Bryant, Jr. must be dismissed because one of the defendant’s prior
tribal convictions was uncounseled and thus could not be used by

26

CANBY, supra note 22, at 79–80.
25 U.S.C. § 1302(7)(B) (2012).
28
United States v. Cavanaugh, 643 F.3d 592, 596 (8th Cir. 2011).
29
18 U.S.C. § 117(a) (2012).
27
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the federal government.30 In the opinion written by Judge Paez, the
court stated that, “tribal court convictions may be used in
subsequent prosecutions only if the tribal court guarantees a right
to counsel that is, at minimum, coextensive with the sixth
amendment right.”31
Michael Bryant, Jr., an Indian and resident of the Northern
Cheyenne Tribe reservation, was charged and convicted of
domestic assault in two separate incidents against two separate
women.32 Both convictions were obtained in the Northern
Cheyenne Tribal Court.33 A month after the second domestic
assault conviction, in June 2011, Michael was federally indicted
under § 117.34
Under the Law and Order Code of the Northern Cheyenne
Tribe, a defendant has the right to defend himself by acquiring an
attorney at the defendant’s own expense.35 Michael did not have
legal counsel in either of his prior tribal court proceedings.36
Furthermore, in a least one of the prior tribal court convictions, he
was sentenced to a term of incarceration.37 The government argued
that because the Sixth Amendment does not govern tribal courts,
the use of the previous convictions should be allowable.38
In issuing its decision in favor of the defendant, the appellate
court based its holding on a prior decision, United States v. Ant.39
In Ant, the court held that because the defendant’s prior tribal
conviction would not have been admissible if it had occurred
anywhere else besides a tribal court; the only way such a
conviction could be admissible in federal proceedings was if the
30

United States v. Bryant, 769 F.3d 671, 679 (9th Cir. 2014).
Id. at 677.
32
Id. at 673 n.2.
33
Id. at 673.
34
Id. at 673.
35
Id. at 674 n.4. This comports with ICRA, which mandates the right for
defendants to obtain counsel at their own expense. Id at 675 n.5.
36
Id. at 673 n.4.
37
Id. at 674 n.3.
38
The court only addressed the Sixth Amendment issue in its opinion, most
likely because in finding the use of the tribal convictions invalid under the Sixth
Amendment, there was no need to do a Fifth Amendment Due Process analysis.
See id. at 679 n.7.
39
Id. at 677.
31
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defendant had made a “knowing and intelligent waiver of his right
to counsel” as required in U.S. court systems.40 Interestingly, after
the Ant ruling, the same Ninth Circuit appellate court held that the
federal firearms statute (18 U.S.C. § 922(g)(9)) was an exception
to the Ant rule and prior uncounseled tribal convictions that
resulted in incarceration could be used as the predicate offense.41
The Bryant decision scarcely references tribal sovereignty in
issuing its decision. In fact, tribal sovereignty is only mentioned in
a footnote to provide explanation of the inapplicability of the
Constitution to tribal courts.42 The lack of discussion about the
unique status of tribal courts in relation to U.S. courts leaves the
question of whether the Ninth Circuit adequately understood the
reasons tribal convictions should be upheld and respected, despite
being different from U.S. courts. Additionally, the opinion makes
no reference to principles of comity or respecting tribal
adjudicatory procedure in its sovereign capacity, which arguably
weakens the Ninth Circuit’s argument due to a lack of complete
discussion.
In Judge Watford’s concurring opinion, he argues that the Ant
ruling should be reexamined.43 He supports this conclusion by
discussing the inconsistency of the Ant ruling with the Supreme
Court’s ruling in Nichols v. United States.44 In Nichols, the Court
held that an uncounseled U.S. misdemeanor conviction, with no
term of imprisonment, could be used to enhance sentencing for a
subsequent offense that would result in incarceration.45
Understandably, Judge Watford was concerned that the holding in
Ant reached beyond the boundaries of the Supreme Court holding
in Nichols—which does not completely agree with the Ninth
Circuit that uncounseled convictions are presumptively unusable.46

40

Id. at 676–77 (internal quotation marks omitted) (quoting United States v.
Ant, 882 F.2d 1389, 1394 (9th Cir. 1989)).
41
Id. at 677; see also United States v. First, 731 F.3d 998, 1001, 1003 (9th Cir.
2013).
42
Bryant, 769 F.3d 671, 675 n.5 (9th Cir. 2014).
43
Id. at 679.
44
Id. at 679–80.
45
Id at 679.
46
Id.
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Hypothesizing about the constitutionality of the tribal
proceedings, had they occurred in a U.S. court, is inconsequential
because the Constitution does not apply to tribes. As Judge
Watford frankly articulated:
[T]he fact remains that [Bryant’s] prior convictions
were not obtained in violation of the sixth
amendment [sic] because they occurred in tribal
court, where the sixth amendment [sic] doesn’t
apply . . . . So aren’t we really saying that the right
to appointed counsel is necessary to ensure the
reliability of all tribal court convictions? If that’s
true, we seem to be denigrating the integrity of
tribal course . . . . [R]espect for the integrity of an
independent sovereign’s courts should preclude
such quick judgment [against tribal conviction
validity].47
Judge Watford went on to stress the need for the U.S. Supreme
Court to issue a clear and definitive answer for federal use of
uncounseled tribal court convictions because of the stark
differences in opinion between the Ninth Circuit and the rulings
from the Eighth and Tenth circuits.
On July 6, 2015, the Ninth Circuit Court of Appeals denied a
petition to rehear Bryant en banc.48 Although the court order
merely states that there were not enough votes in favor of
rehearing the case, the concurring opinion by Judge Paez (joined
by Judge Pregerson) provides a look at the misplaced legal
reasoning held by some of the judiciary regarding tribal
adjudication. In his opinion, Judge Paez recognizes that: 1) the
Sixth Amendment is not applicable to Indian tribes, 2) ICRA does
not require a right to counsel that is in line with the U.S.
Constitution, and 3) Congress has made clear its intention to
“aggressively” address domestic assault in Indian Country.49
However, despite all of his express recognition, Judge Paez
47

Id at 679–80.
Id. at 1042. An “en banc” hearing is when all judges are “present and
participating.” BLACK’S LAW DICTIONARY (10th ed. 2014).
49
Id. at 1043–44.
48
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ultimately falls back upon United States v. Ant’s ruling (that
uncounseled tribal convictions cannot be used) because its
“approach adheres to the Sixth Amendment’s core interest in
reliability.”50 As Judge Watford highlighted in his concurring
opinion in Bryant’s first appellate court ruling, isn’t Judge Paez
really questioning the validity of all tribal court convictions?51
In this opinion, the appellate court again fails to explain why
tribal sovereignty and principles of comity do not warrant
recognition of Bryant’s prior tribal convictions. Interestingly,
Judge Paez does make it a point to state that “no part of the
decision in Bryant is intended to express contempt for tribal courts.
Nor does [the] decision frustrate the purpose of [§ 117] simply
because it conditions the use of prior trial court misdemeanor
convictions that result in imprisonment on the provision of
counsel.”52 Judge Paez’s position does exactly what he says it does
not, it frustrates the purpose of § 117, as applied to Indian
domestic assault victims. Congress has explicitly recognized the
severity of domestic violence and the need to hold offenders
accountable.53 Yet, if courts are unwilling to provide tribal courts
the deference otherwise afforded to foreign courts, Indian domestic
assault offenders are able to escape the punishment that is
commensurate with the habitual nature of their behavior.
Alternatively, in the dissent opinion to the reconsideration
denial, Judge Owens gets straight to the heart of what is at stake in
these types of cases:
Michael Bryant likes to beat women. Sometimes he
kicks them. Sometimes he punches them.
Sometimes he drags them by their hair. He punched
and kicked one girlfriend repeatedly, threw her to
the floor, and even hit her. When he could not find
his keys, he choked another woman to the verge of
passing out. Although his violence varies, his
50

Id. at 1043 (emphasis added).
See supra note 47 and accompanying text.
52
Bryant, 792 F.3d at 1044.
53
WHITE HOUSE, FACTSHEET: THE VIOLENCE AGAINST WOMEN ACT 1 (2014),
available at
https://www.whitehouse.gov/sites/default/files/docs/vawa_factsheet.pdf (last
visited Oct. 17, 2015).
51
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punishment never does. Despite Bryant’s brutality –
resulting in seven convictions for domestic violence
– his worst sentence was a slap on the wrist: oneyear imprisonment, or what someone who
“borrows” a neighbor’s . . . magazine from the
mailbox . . . would face.54
In addition to highlighting the staggering rates of domestic
assault suffered by Indian (including Alaskan Native) women, the
dissent opinion emphasizes the inconsistency of punishment that
results from this circuit split.55 Depending on where an offender is
located geographically, he may or may not be held accountable for
his habitually assaultive behavior.56 Ultimately, both opinions
expressly agree that the resolution of this issue lies at the feet of
the Supreme Court.57
2. Contradictory Rulings out of the Eighth and Tenth Circuits
In United States v. Cavanaugh out of the Eighth Circuit and
United States v. Shavanaux out of the Tenth Circuit, the U.S.
appellate courts came to a completely different ruling than the
Ninth Circuit. Although each court used different reasoning to
reach the same conclusion, both courts ultimately determined that
because Indian tribes are not subject to the Constitution, no
constitutional violation existed that would preclude subsequent use
of uncounseled tribal convictions for charges under § 117.
a. United States v. Cavanaugh
Roman Cavanaugh, Jr. was charged with “Domestic Assault by
a Habitual Offender” after the domestic assault incident described
at the beginning of this Article.58 The incident resulting in
Roman’s federal charges was subsequent to three previous tribal
domestic abuse convictions in March 2005, April 2005, and

54

Bryant, 792 F.3d at 1044–45 (emphasis added).
Id. at 1045.
56
Id. at 1044–46.
57
United States v. Cavanaugh, 643 F.3d 592, 594–95 (8th Cir. 2011).
58
Id. at 593.
55
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January 2008.59 The previous convictions came out of the Spirit
Lake Tribal Court.60 Roman never made any allegations of
impropriety or appealed any of his convictions, notwithstanding
the existence of a tribal court appeal procedure.61
In reaching its decision, the appellate court discussed in detail
prior cases that involved Sixth Amendment violations in U.S. court
proceedings that resulted in incarceration.62 In what appears to be
an underlying persuasive element of its ruling, the opinion
discusses the exceptional nature of using prior convictions that do
not comport with U.S. constitutional procedure for repeat-offender
or enhancement statutes.63 The Court cites Nichols v. United
States, which states that “recidivist statutes . . . do not change the
penalty imposed for the earlier conviction . . . this Court
consistently has sustained repeat-offender laws as penalizing only
the last offense committed by the offender.”64
The court acknowledged the unique nature of tribal courts in
order to differentiate tribal convictions from the previous cases that
expressed great concern about the reliability of uncounseled
convictions. The opinion then addresses the Ninth Circuit Ant
holding by differentiating the circumstances of that case from
Cavanaugh. It explains that Ant is not applicable in this case
because Ant sought to use a tribal conviction to prove subsequent
federal charges that arose out of the same incident.65

59

Id.
Id.
61
Id.
62
Id. at 596–600; see Baldasar v. Illinois, 446 U.S. 222, 222–24 (1980) (holding
that an uncounseled misdemeanor conviction, that did not include incarceration,
could not be used to enhance subsequent charges); see also Scott v. Illinois, 440
U.S. 367, 368–74 (1979) (holding that the Sixth Amendment right to counsel is
violated when any term of incarceration is imposed); see also Burgett v. Texas,
389 U.S. 109, 110–16 (1967) (holding that an uncounseled felony conviction
could not be used to enhance punishment from a subsequent recidivist charge);
see also United States v. White, 529 F.2d 1390, 1391–94 (8th Cir. 1976)
(holding that where the defendant was convicted without properly waiving a
right to counsel, the term of incarceration was vacated but the conviction was
affirmed).
63
Cavanaugh, 643 F.3d at 598–600.
64
Id. at 598–600; see also Nichols v. United States, 511 U.S. 738, 746–47
(1994) (quoting Baldasar, 446 U.S. at 232 (Powell, J., dissenting)).
65
Cavanaugh, 643 F.3d at 604.
60
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In line with the Tenth Circuit decision in United States v.
Shavanaux, the Eighth Circuit based its decision on principles of
comity and ultimately concluded that in the absence of a
constitutional violation, use of uncounseled tribal convictions
cannot be precluded.66 While the Eighth Circuit did its best to
tackle the complicated relationship between sovereign Indian tribes
and the U.S. federal courts, the Tenth Circuit ruling in Shavanaux
proved more eloquent in articulating the substantial importance of
tribal sovereignty and principles of comity, in ultimately upholding
the use of tribal convictions.
b. United States v. Shavanaux
In United States v. Shavanaux, the Tenth Circuit U.S. Court of
Appeals upheld the use of Adam Shavanaux’s prior uncounseled
tribal convictions in bringing charges under § 117.67 The appellate
court based its decision on principles of comity, its determination
that Shavanaux’s tribal convictions were absent of any Due
Process violations (as required under ICRA), and its determination
that the prior uncounseled tribal convictions did not violate the
Sixth Amendment because the Constitution is not applicable to
Indian tribes.68
In the opinion written by Judge Lucero, the analysis of a
potential Sixth Amendment violation begins with an examination
of the unique relationship between Indian tribes and the United
States.69 Judge Lucero contends that a sovereign proceeding
ungoverned by the Constitution and thus different from
constitutional procedure does not make the conviction
“constitutionally infirm.”70 This determination directly conflicts
with the Ninth Circuit opinion in Bryant. In reaching this
conclusion, the court reasoned that at the time of the tribal
proceedings that resulted in the previous convictions, there was no
Sixth Amendment violation and furthermore, subsequent use of
66

Id. at 594.
United States v. Shavanaux, 647 F.3d 993, 1002 (10th Cir. 2011).
68
Id. at 997–98.
69
Id.
70
Id. at 997.
67

98

American Indian Law Journal

[Vol. 4:85

those tribal convictions would not create a brand new Sixth
Amendment violation.71
Additionally, the court determined that the tribal convictions
did not violate Due Process rights because the proceedings fully
complied with ICRA.72 Furthermore, the tribal proceedings were
otherwise absent of improprieties that would preclude subsequent
use of these “foreign court” convictions.73
The unique status of Indian tribes as sovereign nations (and
thus warranting treatment of its convictions as those of a foreign
court), stems from the fact that tribes and tribal governance existed
prior to the creation of the U.S. Constitution.74 The next section
will examine tribal sovereignty and why the Federal Constitution
does not govern tribes, then briefly discuss principles of comity
and the Full Faith and Credit Clause.
II. TRIBAL SOVEREIGNTY PRECEDED THE UNITED STATES
CONSTITUTION
The determination of whether to allow the use of an
uncounseled conviction obtained in tribal courts is uniquely
applicable to Indian tribal members. This unique situation stems
from our country’s history: the “discovery” of land that became the
United States; land that Indian tribes were already long residing.
Although the English conquered the land that encompasses the
United States, Indian tribes have remained distinct entities.75
Indian tribal nations are geographically within the boundaries of
the U.S., yet maintain tribal sovereignty to the extent it has not
been limited by the U.S. legislature or a treaty.76
Tribal sovereignty existed prior to the formation of the U.S.
and thus derives from the tribes themselves and is not reliant on the
U.S. Constitution for its creation. As Charles Wilkinson articulated
in American Indians, Time, and the Law, “tribal authority was not
71
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created by the Constitution – tribal sovereignty predated the
formation of the United States and continued after it.”77 Therefore,
to hold sovereign nations that are not governed by the Constitution
to its requirements and presume that any deviation lends to a
presumption of invalidity appears to be somewhat autocratic.
A. Principles of Comity and the Full Faith and Credit Clause
Recognition of foreign court judgments generally falls under
one of two categories: 1) the Full Faith and Credit Clause; or 2)
principles of comity. First, Full Faith and Credit requires
recognition of other jurisdictional judgments within the U.S., and
otherwise, as delegated by Congress.78 Congress has required Full
Faith and Credit in certain Indian tribal matters, including
judgments under the Indian Child Welfare Act (ICWA), among
others.79 While Congress may choose to extend Full Faith and
Credit to tribal domestic assault convictions at some point in the
future; at a minimum, courts have the flexibility to extend
recognition of tribal convictions via principles of comity.
Second, under principles of comity, courts have the ability to
recognize foreign judgments deemed appropriate.80 In instances in
which recognition of foreign judgments is not required, principles
of comity allow courts to respect the sovereignty of another
nation’s proceedings, albeit different than our own.81 The primary
treatise in Indian law, Cohen’s Federal Indian Law Handbook,
describes the comity doctrine generally.
[T]he comity doctrine allows the receiving court
greater discretion to determine whether to enforce
77
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U.S. CONST. art. IV, § 1.
79
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the foreign judgment . . . a court using the principles
of comity may refuse to enforce a foreign judgment
either because it was reached through procedures
the receiving court views as fundamentally unfair,
because the rendering court lacked jurisdiction, or
because the judgment violates a strongly held public
policy of the form.82
The cases that have given rise to the circuit split are absent of
any other circumstances that would lend towards presumptive
exclusion in federal courts.
Realistically, not all tribal court convictions will be absent of
other allegations of impropriety, or will be otherwise invalid for
subsequent use. Extending recognition under principles of comity
allows courts the flexibility to recognize those convictions as
applicable and exclude convictions that were obtained under
suspect circumstances. Within the limited scope and analysis
provided in this Article, arguing for full faith and credit may prove
too rigid and limiting on courts to enforce tribal convictions that do
not warrant extensions. As each Indian tribe is its own sovereign
nation, each tribe maintains different adjudicatory proceedings (if
any exist at all). A full analysis of the inconsistency presented by
these unique circumstances in cases of additional alleged
improprieties is beyond the scope of this Article and one that is
required before an argument for full faith and credit extension can
be made.
III. THE UNIQUE RELATIONSHIP BETWEEN TRIBAL AND U.S. COURT
SYSTEMS
The Sixth Amendment of the U.S. Constitution provides
criminal defendants with court-appointed legal representation to
assist in their defense if the defendant is indigent.83 This right is
accorded to all U.S. criminal defendants unless the right has been
waived. Alternatively, ICRA, which governs Indian Tribal
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Proceedings, does not require court appointed defense in cases that
seek to impose terms of incarceration that are less than one year.84
In Cavanaugh, the court noted that preclusion of uncounseled
tribal convictions would result if there was any existence of a
constitutional violation. 85 However, as Indian tribal proceedings
are not governed by the Constitution, a constitutional violation
does not exist. Furthermore, a constitutional violation would not be
created anew if the conviction were later used as a predicate
offense for habitual domestic assault charges because the
protections accorded by the Sixth Amendment apply at the time of
adjudication.86
Within the U.S. court system, convictions in which the
defendant did not have counsel have generally been precluded
from subsequent use for enhancement and recidivist statutes.87
However, preclusion from subsequent use does not always mean
completely vacating the original uncounseled conviction.88 For
example in Scott, an eighth circuit appellate court held that because
the defendant had not clearly waived his right to counsel (but was
then not provided counsel) in a proceeding that resulted in a
suspended sentence, the imposition of a jail sentence was
improper.89 However, the court in Scott also affirmed the
uncounseled conviction itself because it found sufficient evidence
of the defendant’s guilt.90 As such, arguments regarding the
reliability-concerns of uncounseled convictions do not appear to be
universal.
As sovereign nations with inherent rights of authority over
tribal members, Indian tribal proceedings are treated as convictions
of foreign courts. Historically, U.S. courts have used various
foreign court convictions in U.S. court proceedings, so the use of
tribal convictions is not as unusual as protestors seek to suggest.
84
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As the Shavanaux opinion noted, “federal courts have repeatedly
recognized foreign convictions and accepted evidence obtained
overseas by foreign law enforcement through means that deviate
from our constitutional protections.”91 There are no obvious and
overarching circumstances present in tribal proceedings that would
warrant a presumption of preclusion other than the presence of
Constitutional deviation.
The Restatement of Foreign Relations provides a framework by
which foreign court proceedings should warrant exclusion. Only in
cases where a judgment was obtained in an impartial judicial
system or the court rendering the judgment did not have
jurisdiction over the defendant should there be a presumption of
invalidity.92 None of the three courts discussed in this paper
determined that either situation presented itself in any of the tribal
convictions. Furthermore, none of the tribal defendants alleged
non-compliance with ICRA which governed the tribal proceedings.
A. The Indian Civil Rights Act
Indian Tribes are governed by ICRA (and as of 2010 the Tribal
Law and Order Act).93 Although the Constitution does not govern
tribes, Congress selectively applied certain protections from the
Bill of Rights to tribal members, via ICRA.94 Of particular
importance in U.S. criminal proceedings are the protections
afforded under the Due Process Clause. The Fifth Amendment of
the Constitution requires that ”no person shall … be deprived of
life, liberty, or property, without due process of law…”95
Accordingly, ICRA states that “No Indian tribe in exercising
powers of self-government shall … deny to any person within its
91
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also Tribal Law & Order Act of 2010, Pub. L. No. 111-211, 124 Stat. 2258
(2010).
94
Constitutional Rights of Indians, 25 U.S.C. §§ 1301–1303 (2010). “Congress
passed the Indian Civil Rights Act, selectively applying some, but not all,
protections from the Bill of Rights to situations where an Indian Tribe is a
governmental actor.” United States v. Cavanaugh, 643 F.3d 592, 596 (8th Cir.
2011).
95
U.S. CONST. amend. V.
92

2015]

Protecting Victims of Domestic Assault

103

jurisdiction the equal protection of its laws or deprive any person
of liberty or property without due process of law.”96
Furthermore, ICRA affords criminal defendants the right of
counsel in cases that seek to impose a term of incarceration beyond
one year.97 Thus, as articulated in the Cavanaugh opinion, “if a
tribe elects not to provide for the right to appointed counsel
through its own laws, Indian defendants in tribal court have no
Constitutional or statutory right to appointed counsel unless
sentenced to a term of incarceration greater than one year.”98
In the tribal convictions of Bryant, Cavanaugh, and
Shavanaux, the proceedings fully complied with ICRA and were
absent of any allegations of impropriety. The inclusion of tribal
convictions in § 177 and the Congressional exclusion of any
requirements to provide defense counsel in tribal proceedings less
than one year in ICRA, should logically result in a presumption of
validity.
IV. ARGUMENTS AGAINST USE OF TRIBAL CONVICTIONS FOR
FEDERAL CHARGES
Indian defendants have raised a number of defenses to support
the preclusion of federal use of tribal domestic assault convictions
for subsequent federal criminal charges under § 117. This section
explains why the arguments raised in Bryant, Cavanuagh, and
Shavanaux are unpersuasive.
A. Allowing Use of Uncounseled Tribal Convictions Effectively
Results in Racial Bias
In Shavanaux, the defendant argued that allowing for use of
uncounseled tribal convictions in federal charges would result in
96
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an exception that would apply only to American Indians.99 The
court responded by drawing a distinction between a purely racial
classification and a “political” classification, with Indians falling
under the second group, due to the unique relationship between
Indians and U.S. federal law.100
It would be hard to deny that allowing for use of uncounseled
tribal convictions in federal prosecutions would not result in a
situation that is applicable only to Indians. However, the
Shavanaux court’s attempt to differentiate between racial and
political classifications is unnecessary. This differentiation is
unnecessary because the unique relationship between the sovereign
nations creates a compelling interest that warrants recognition of
tribal proceedings. Albeit, in other circumstances, classifications
that fall along racial lines may necessitate avoidance when
possible. The result should not be viewed in terms of bias and
instead should be viewed as recognition of the inherent right of
tribes to govern Indians in criminal matters. Additionally, such a
result is necessary to fill the gap that is created by the limitation of
tribes to impose punishment beyond a certain threshold.
B. Because Tribal Courts Can Be Dysfunctional, the Presumption
of Validity is Inaccurate
Each Indian tribe is considered to be a sovereign entity. As
such, tribal proceedings can vary greatly. Some tribes, such as the
Navajo Nation, have a well-established adjudicatory system,101
other tribes maintain no adjudicatory system at all, and many tribes
fall somewhere in between. Cavanaugh noted the district court’s
concern about the deficiency of tribal court systems as a whole,
“caused by a lack of resources [and] the ongoing lack of resources
to overcome these shortcomings.”102
The concern regarding the lack of resources available in many
tribes to properly establish an acceptable court system does have
merit. However, the tribal proceedings in Bryant, Cavanaugh, and
99
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Shavanaux were absent of any allegations of non-compliance with
ICRA, which provides the requisite standards to warrant
presumption of validity.103 Recognition of tribal convictions based
on principles of comity allows courts to filter out those improper
and otherwise suspect tribal proceedings as necessary. Arguably, if
the concern were such that any uncounseled conviction are suspect,
then affirmation of uncounseled U.S. convictions or other foreign
convictions that deviate from U.S. constitutional procedure while
denying Indian tribal convictions would result in an inconsistency
that appears to fall along racial (and political) classifications.
The arguments raised by the defendants to preclude use of their
prior tribal convictions do not warrant much examination. Even in
the Ninth Circuit, which determined that use of tribal uncounseled
convictions was precluded, the basis was comparable
unconstitutionality and not on either of the arguments discussed.
Once the determination is made that a constitutional violation is
not created anew, it becomes hard to argue for preclusion of
otherwise valid tribal convictions without relying on an underlying
assumption of tribal invalidity or dismissal of tribal sovereignty.
CONCLUSION
Reasonable minds have differed regarding the ability of the
U.S. federal government to use uncounseled tribal convictions as
the predicate offenses to charge an individual under § 117. The
deviation in opinion centers around the constitutionality of using
convictions obtained in proceedings that, had they occurred in U.S.
courts, would have been unconstitutional. However, the
convictions were not obtained in the U.S. court system and as such
were not governed by the Constitution. By all accounts, the tribal
convictions were obtained in compliance with ICRA, which
governs these proceedings.
Although three different cases give rise to the circuit split, at
their cores all three cases involve the same situation: habitual
domestic offenders, otherwise valid tribal justice proceedings and
convictions, and additional domestic assaults warranting a higher
103
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level of punishment than most tribes are able to impose. Absent
any allegations of impropriety and in the circumstances presented
in these three cases, use of uncounseled tribal convictions should
not be precluded on grounds on unconstitutionality and recognition
of those convictions should be extended on principles of comity.
While none of the opinions express any overt biases towards
Indian tribal proceedings, preclusion from use of tribal convictions
could result in a step backwards in the judicial treatment of tribal
sovereignty. Supreme Court review is crucial in affirming the
inherent rights of Indian tribes to govern Indians in criminal
matters and the decision will likely turn on the majority views of
tribal sovereignty and the validity of tribal courts. If the Supreme
Court rules otherwise, Indian domestic assault victims will be left
vulnerable to their assailants in a way that no other U.S. citizen is
subject to.104
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Prior to publication of this Article, the United States Supreme Court granted
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